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NOTES
DEEDS-MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE
The appellee's uncle being the owner in fee of two tracts
of land granted the same by deed to the appellee, his niece. He
died a few days after the deed was executed and the appellant,
his grandnephew and only other heir, instituted this action
immediately to set aside the deed on the ground that the grantor
was mentally incapacitated to convey the land. Some time prior
to the execution of the deed and while testifying for himself
on the hearing of a motion which had for its purpose the
appointment of a receiver to take charge of and settle the affairs
of a partnership of which he was the only surviving member, the
grantor failed to identify the denomination of certain bills or to
make simple calculations at the request of the counsel for the
plaintiff.
In Davin on Real Estate, volume 1, page 109, the rule for
determining the mental capacity of the grantor to execute a deed
is stated to be: "A deed may be avoided on the ground of insanity, when the grantor did not possess sufficient strength of mind
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and reason to understand the nature and consequences of his act
in executing it. And by its execution he does not make it his
deed if at the time he was, from weakness of mind, incapable of
understanding it if explained to him. But although it may be
uncertain that the mind of the grantor was in all respects sound,
still, if he has sufficient ability to execute and deliver a deed,
understanding the consideration he is to receive, and the nature
of the transaction in transferring his title to another, it is considered that his mind is sufficiently sound to render his deed
valid. The question to be determined in all these cases is whether
the grantor understands what he is doing. If he understands the
act, it is immaterial that his faculties are impaired by age, or
that he had severe bodily ailments, or that he is both old and
physically weak, or that he is old and eccentric." Substantially
the same rule is laid down in 13 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 576, and 18 Corpus Juris 218.
In Ex ParteBarnsley, 26 Chancellor Reports 899, the court
said: "Being non compos, of unsound mind, are certain terms in
law, and import a total deprivation of sense." This was taken
to be the rule in the New York case of Stewart's Executors v.
Lispenard 26 Wend. 255. According to these two cases, the
grantor must be totally insane before a deed which he executed
is void, and the least show of intelligence in any act was sufficient to make his deed valid.
This rule was soon changed, however, and in the case of
Ball v. Manning, 6 H. L. 568, the court of the exchequer instructed the jury that: "To constitute such unsoundness of mind
as should avoid a deed at law, the person executing such deed
must be incapable of understanding and acting in the ordinary
affairs of life." And, "As one test of such incapacity, the jury
were at liberty to consider whether he was capable of understanding what he did in executing the deed in question, when its general import was explained to him." This case was appealed to
the House of Lords and there the court specifically mentioned
these instructions and upheld them. The New York case of
Hoey v. Hoey, 65 N. Y. S. 778, says: "If, at the time of the execution of the instrument sought to he avoided, the mental conditiou was such that the act was the intelligent act of the individual, based upon his intelligent rational judgment, with suffi-
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cient mental power to understand the nature of his property and
his relation to those who would be the subject of his bounty, and
without prompting, to arrive at a determination as to what disposition he wished to make of it, the court is not justified in declaring such disposition invalid." The test now seems to be, was
the grantor's mind of such strength that he could grasp the
facts relating to the act he was about to make and that he could
realize the natural consequences which were liable to follow its
execution. Amongst the cases decided by a rule similar to the
one stated above are the following: Edwards v. Davenport, 20
Fed. 756; Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480; Mann v.
Keen, 86 Fed. 51; Sawyer v. White, 122, Fed. 223; Pisher v.
Fisher, 9 N. Y. S. 4; Ia Be Lawrence, 62 N. Y. S. 673; Williams
v. Williams, 133 Nich. 21; and Lane v. Lane, 160 Mich. 492.
The rule in Kentucky is similar to the one in the Ball and
Hoey cases above cited. In the case of Huffaker v. Branner the
court said: "I'lere mental weakness is not sufficient to invalidate
a conveyance if the grantor have sufficient mental capacity to
understand the nature, object and purpose of the contract or
deed; but if he be so mentally incapacitated as tc be unable to
understand or appreciate the nature, object and effect of the
contract or deed, it is unenforceable, for it does not express his
purpose and is not his deed but the purpose and deed of another,
he not having sufficient capacity to enter into such contract."
The following cases are amongst the Kentucky cases decided on
a similar basis: Lassiter v. Lassiter, 63 S. W. 477; Speers v.
Sewell, 67 Ky. 239; Richardson v. Hunt, 4 R. 829; Watkens v.
Scaggs, 161 Ky. 600; Herzogg v. Gibson, 170 Ky. 325; Lewis v.
Lewis, 194 Ky. 172, and Akers v. Akers, 24 Ky. L. R. 636.
In the case of Gillock v. Williams, 199 Ky. 169, the court
said: "In determining these questions the mental weakness of the
grantor is not conclusive, for, as has often been held, mental
weakness alone is not sufficient to justify the annulment Qf a
deed, if it does not amount to such infirmity as to destroy the
grantor's power to act voluntarily and freely and to appraise
the consequences of his acts." The court held that the failure to
identify the bills or to make the calculations were not conclusive
as to the grantor's mental capacity to make the deed; that the
weight of the court's order appointing a receiver was largely

